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angela sorby
“A Dimple in the Tomb”: 
Cuteness in Emily Dickinson
In one of Emily Dickinson’s early poems (Fr96), bees are 
described as “Pigmy seraphs – gone astray – / Velvet people 
from Vevay –.”3 They are small, they are lost, they are swathed 
in fuzzy fabric, and they emit a charming Gallic buzz.4 There 
is a word for these little insects from the French-speaking 
part of Switzerland, and the word is cute. During the modern 
era, as Emily Dickinson’s critical reputation rose, her pygmy 
seraphs, elfin mushrooms (Fr1350, line 1), and chubby-
cheeked squirrels (Fr915, lines 9-10) became something of 
an embarrassment. James Dickey, steeped in the gendered 
aesthetics of the midcentury canon, cast Dickinson’s cuteness 
as a function of her femininity, and her femininity as a 
handicap. And even as feminists sought to affirm Dickinson’s 
“This is one of the reasons that people who don’t like Emily 
Dickinson don’t like her, because she has this eternally cute, 
kind of smirking cuteness about her,  about so much of her  work, 
especially the better known work.”1 
—James Dickey, 1972
“At first, I wanted nothing much to do with her. She was 
like a relative I knew too well and was ashamed of. I found 
her cuteness, in some lines of the poems of hers that I read in 
school, at best weak, at worst cloying: ‘I like to see it lap the 
Miles –’ (Fr383), ‘I’ll put a trinket on’ (Fr32)—not to mention 
the ubiquitous ‘A Bird, came down the Walk –’ (Fr359). That 
one annoyed me especially.”2
—Annie Finch, 2008
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status as a strong woman poet, they did so by minimizing 
the cute factor; thus in her famous essay, “Vesuvius at Home” 
(1976), Adrienne rich dismisses Dickinson’s “kittenish” tone 
as a false performance of “innocuousness and containment” 
that hides the more authentic and volcanic Dickinson.5 
rich’s squeamishness (like Finch’s) makes sense given the 
extent to which women poets have had to fight to be taken 
seriously. In twentieth-century America, Emily Dickinson 
could not be cute if she were to be powerful. To represent a 
poet or a poem as cute was to feminize it, and to feminize it 
was to diminish, objectify, or cheapen it. 
Thanks partly to the battles won by second-wave feminists 
such as rich and Finch, it has become less obligatory 
to cringe at the cuteness that pops up so frequently in 
Dickinson’s poetry. In their pioneering study of Dickinson’s 
humor, Susan Juhasz, Cristanne Miller, and Martha nell 
Smith note in passing that “Dickinson often calls attention 
to her speaker and her subject as cute,” remarking that such 
poems are “obviously designed to charm.”6 But if a charm is 
a pretty trinket, it can also be a powerful spell. Even today, 
cuteness remains a risky strategy for any female poet, critic, 
or reader to embrace. like sexiness, it sparks a physiological 
flood that threatens to drown a poem’s more cerebral effects. 
And like sentimentalism, it has often been associated with 
low-prestige nurturing impulses. 
Furthermore, cuteness is an unstable element: once 
the pleasure rush has been delivered, the cute can quickly 
turn cloying, creepy, or even repellent—a tipping point 
described by the artificial intelligence researcher Masahiro 
Mori as the uncanny valley.7 And, of course, the cultural 
devaluation of instant gratification was already underway in 
the nineteenth century, even as purveyors of popular culture 
were learning how to elicit such emotional responses using 
sentimental, sensational, and cute triggers. Thus, T. W. 
Higginson—who in his preface to Dickinson’s 1893 Poems 
likens her to Mignon, a Goethe character whose name 
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means cute in French—elsewhere denigrates the use of the 
word cute as one of many “small inelegancies” that “grate” 
on the ears of cultivated men.8 More recently, the theorist 
Sianne ngai has discussed cuteness at length, stressing 
its power to gratify even as she insists that “the cute” is 
trivial —a small inelegancy—compared to major aesthetic 
categories like “the beautiful” or “the sublime.”9
Dickinson, however, is nothing if not a risk-taker, and 
in her poems, cuteness’ visceral power, affective instability, 
and low prestige make it simultaneously dangerous and 
useful. Dickinson uses cuteness to engage, not just with 
conventionally fluffy animals, but also with insects, graves, 
and corpses; with an endangered Protestant God; and with 
questions of time, space, and scale. In this essay, then, I 
will argue that the capacity to read for cuteness is a major 
competency, not a minor deficit, and that by cultivating this 
skill, readers can gain access to one of Dickinson’s many 
powerful affective registers. of course, not all of Dickinson’s 
work is cute, but to argue that sophisticated readers should 
never understand the poems in this way is to resist one of 
the important avenues through which her poems engage 
emotions. Cuteness can and indeed must be approached 
through a number of disciplinary lenses, since it registers 
an animal instinct with a strong cultural component. In 
other words, cuteness must be simultaneously understood 
as part of Emily Dickinson’s natural environment and as 
one of her many historically-conditioned responses to that 
environment.
Konrad lorenz, the de facto founder of animal cuteness 
studies, became famous for a series of photographs taken 
during an experiment in which he convinced a brood 
of ducklings that he was their mother, causing them to 
follow him everywhere in a line. like his predecessor 
Charles Darwin, lorenz was interested in the shared 
affective experiences between humans and other animals. 
lorenz proposed that people—and many animals—are 
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hardwired to respond to paedomorphic cues, including “a 
relatively large head, predominance of the brain capsule, 
large and low-lying eyes, bulging cheek region, short and 
thick extremities, a springy elastic consistency, and clumsy 
movements.”10 Cuteness, for lorenz, is thus an “innate 
releasing mechanism,” a kind of instinct spurring adults 
to engage with youngsters and enabling them to build 
beneficial relationships. In exchange for attention, food, 
educational play, and social inclusion, babies (humans, 
ducklings, puppies) offer adults a jolt of sensual, although 
not precisely erotic, pleasure.11 
lorenz was a behaviorist interested in the so-called 
nature/nurture debate, but the human cuteness response is 
not just about maternal nurturing any more than the human 
sexual response is just about procreation. While scientific 
research into the functions of cuteness is ongoing, Gary 
Sherman and Jonathan Haidt have recently theorized that, 
although cuteness evolved in the context of mammalian 
parenting, “it is not best characterized as a direct releaser 
of caretaking behaviors, but rather as a direct releaser of 
human sociality.” Pointing out that babies are cutest not 
at birth (when they tend to be quite wizened) but around 
five months old, they suggest that cuteness is meant to 
reach as many adults as possible—not just parents—and 
that it works to elicit play: physical play, linguistic play, and 
the introduction of toys or transitional objects. Cuteness, 
according to Sherman and Haidt, thus not only supports a 
baby’s development; it also encourages adults to admit the 
baby into a kinship circle, defined not necessarily by blood 
but by a wider species-based sense of affinity.12
The human cuteness response is remarkably polymorphic. 
Humans can find babies cute, but they can also find baby 
ducks cute; they can find pictures of baby ducks cute; they 
can find rubber ducks cute; and they can even find songs 
about rubber ducks (without accompanying visuals) cute.13 
Even human handwriting can be read as cute; the Japanese 
“Puppies.” 1848, color lithograph, library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, 
accessed June 20, 2017, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/95505016/. lC-USZC4-3218.
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kawaii phenomenon—arguably the most hyperarticulated 
cuteness subculture in world history—originated in 
burriko ji, so-called Anomalous Female Teenage Writing, 
a stylized, difficult-to-decipher form of lettering invented 
by young girls.14 Among humans, then, cuteness is a primal 
instinct, but one that is—again, like sexiness—subject to 
intense and variable cultural mediation. And interestingly, 
unlike sexiness, which has long excited the interest of 
Western artists, cuteness was not a regularly sought-after 
effect until well into the nineteenth century.
When Dickinson was born in 1830, the word cute (as 
opposed to ’cute, a contraction of acute meaning clever) 
was just beginning to circulate, and the verbal and visual 
conventions of what would count as cute were still evolving. 
like the trajectory of the homosexual as traced by Michel 
Foucault, the cute was comprised of concrete, episodic 
instances (laughing babies, sportive kittens, funny turns 
of phrase) before it became a named trait.15 By the mid-
nineteenth century, the word was considered a colloquialism; 
print sources suggest that, then as now, it tended to connote 
adorable novelty along with some residual cleverness. For 
instance, in T. H. Arthur’s 1841 story, “other People’s 
Children,” Mrs. Jones (mother of Angeline) brags about 
her daughter to her neighbor, Mrs. Carter:
“Ha! ha! ha!” laughed out Mrs. Jones, as 
something crossed her mind. “you ought 
to have heard Angeline tell her dream this 
morning. ‘What did you dream last night, 
Anne?’ asked her father, when we were all 
seated at the breakfast table. ‘I dreamed, 
father, that we were all sailing in a steamboat 
down in the bay, when a great whale, just like 
a man, came up out of the water, and reached 
out his arm to catch me. But didn’t I scream!’ 
‘Was that what made you cry out in the night 
so?’ said her father. ‘yes, sir,’ she said. ‘And 
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how did you get off, Anne?’ asked her father. 
‘O, I waked up, and then I was off?’ Ha! ha! 
Wasn’t that a cute answer for a child six years 
old to make, Mrs. Carter?”16 
Angeline is precocious but linguistically awkward; she 
requires caretaking but also gives her parents pleasure and 
amusement. By the mid-nineteenth century, coalescing 
social forces—including liberal capitalism and the romantic 
emphasis on the senses—were making cuteness into usable 
aesthetic material, so that Mrs. Jones—via T. H. Arthur—
could name the source of her delight. In the more familiar 
sentimental mode, a pallid, Christlike child (such as Harriet 
Beecher Stowe’s little Eva) invites sympathetic tears. 
Sturdy little Anne, by contrast, makes the adults laugh; her 
sudden self-redemption from the whale is entertaining, not 
spiritually instructive. 
Most of the critical work on cuteness thus far has 
focused on its status as a liberal-capitalist commodity 
aesthetic. As industrial economies began to generate a 
substantial number of middle-class consumers, human 
agency became bound up in new networks of consumption 
and communication. As Karl Marx noticed in the 1840s, 
new forms of commodity fetishism began blurring the lines 
between desiring subjects and coveted objects. Sianne ngai 
traces and expands upon the commodity’s weird half-life 
in her work on cuteness as a modern aesthetic category. 
ngai concludes, inter alia, that cuteness in both art and 
commerce encodes an unstable power dynamic in which 
humans imagine themselves overpowering, but also being 
oddly overpowered by, anthropomorphic objects.17 Charles 
Dickens, a Dickinson family favorite, adopted an early 
version of this logic, sending cadres of cute characters across 
the Atlantic, from the Infant Phenomenon in Nicholas 
Nickleby (1839) to Jenny Wren, the doll’s dressmaker in 
Our Mutual Friend (1865). As lauren Byler has argued, 
Dickens’ novels teem with characters made cute by their 
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“distinguishing quirks, thingly quality, and generally 
misshapen quaintness.” Byler suggests that cuteness is “a 
mode of passive aggression” by which Dickens’s characters 
“actively stage themselves as vulnerable little objects in 
order to assert themselves and to fulfill particular desires.”18 
literary cuteness, in this view, is a symptom, staging (albeit 
sometimes subversively) identities and relationships defined 
by systems of domination.
Dickinson’s use of cuteness certainly registers her 
awareness of systems of domination, especially in familial 
and religious contexts. However, these very systems were 
also changing in the wake of transatlantic romanticism—a 
set of discourses that, by emphasizing internal sensations 
and impulses, came to value the cuteness response as 
an adjunct to creativity. Dickinson absorbed romantic 
structures of feeling from multiple sources, but Friedrich 
Schiller’s influential work on passion (the sense-drive), 
reason (the form-drive), and the Spieltraub (the play-drive) 
is particularly relevant here. Jed Deppman notes that, 
while Dickinson probably encountered Schiller’s writings 
through the Hedges translations in the Atlantic and through 
Carlyle’s Life of Schiller (1825), Schiller’s influence, like that 
of other German philosophers, was diffuse and pervasive 
in her milieu.19 For Schiller, the passions (unleashed by 
what lorenz would call innate release mechanisms, such as 
cuteness) are corporeal and compulsive, linking humans to 
other animals. reason, by contrast, operates in an abstract, 
formal realm where independent decisions can be made 
and ethical systems can be constructed. For Kant, reason 
is paramount, but for Schiller, passion and reason must 
inform one another, so that humans can be human, neither 
brutish nor mechanically logical, navigating between 
necessity and autonomy. This “being human” is not a fixed 
state but a process that entails dwelling in what Schiller 
calls freedom and what Dickinson calls Possibility. And 
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for Schiller—as for Dickinson—one way to generate this 
freedom/possibility is through play.20
Schiller posits aesthetic beauty as the bridge through 
which passion and reason can reconcile, not by hardening 
into a third, fixed state, but by being in constant play or 
flux. Dickinson also engages with, and produces, beauty, 
of course. But when she deploys cuteness, the terms shift 
subtly; instead of producing an experience of the sublime, 
or the transcendent, or the ethical, or any other standard 
romantic outcome, cuteness sparks play and play sparks 
relationships—which are, in turn, a form of play. In “A fuzzy 
fellow, without feet –” (Fr171), for example, the speaker 
meets a caterpillar:
A fuzzy fellow, without feet – 
yet doth exceeding run! 
of velvet, is his Countenance – 
And his complexion, dun!
(lines 1-4)
Cuteness is not beauty: the caterpillar is attractive because he 
is small and oddly-shaped (look here! A novelty!). And yet 
he is not repellent; his fuzz, like the new growth on a baby’s 
head, invites the reader to touch it. The poem’s speaker feels 
an affinity with him that crosses species-boundaries, and 
like many cute animals since, the caterpillar finds himself 
dressed up like a person—wrapped in a little swatch of 
velvet. The velvet partly covers his “dun” skin, evoking a 
surge of fuzzy fellow-feeling in the cute-competent reader.
The caterpillar may be “dun,” but he is not done; as 
the poem begins, he too is just beginning to develop. The 
speaker supports his growth through play, staging an infinite 
drama in the grass and trees. The caterpillar responds 
equally playfully, dropping “in plush / opon the Passer-
by” (lines 7-8), who may be the speaker, the reader, or a 
random stranger. The poem’s kinship circle gently enlarges 
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to include anyone who is willing to play along, eschewing 
mastery in exchange for multiple possibilities and surprises. 
The caterpillar tries out different residences (tree? grass?), 
outfits (velvet? damask?), and even genders (fellow? lady?) 
without settling into one place, because the point is the 
process.
Just as the caterpillar’s body is cute, so too does the poem’s 
language exhibit lorenz’s “springy elastic consistency, and 
clumsy movements.”21 Although, unlike the caterpillar, the 
poem has visible feet, it totters; for example, line 16 does 
not quite scan metrically: “you’d scarce recognize him!” The 
poem’s archaisms—“doth,” “yclept”—also contribute to 
its charming awkwardness (line 2, 17). This is Dickinson 
half dressed up as Isaac Watts, whose busy bee, cute in its 
own right, neatly spreads wax in a little cell.22 And yet, of 
course, this poem is only playing at being a didactic Watts 
song—a game that becomes clear in the poem’s closing 
lines, when the speaker refuses to state a moral: “Who am 
I,” the speaker asks coyly, “To tell the pretty secret / of the 
Butterfly!”(lines 18-20).
What is the butterfly’s secret? We may use the word 
butterfly, but that is a human word, meant to render 
experience as fixed and finite. Jane Donahue Eberwein 
understands the butterfly as a figure that reverses 
“industrious yankee values,” and this makes some sense, 
especially given its implicit relationship to Watts’  busy bee.23 
However, I do not think this poem is just a flipped allegory 
that elevates butterfly over bee. rather, as the poem’s fuzzy 
fellow releases palpable fellow-feeling in the reader, this 
passing pleasure overrides the teleological aims of pro-bee 
Calvinist convention and pro-butterfly romantic pedagogy. 
of course, to reduce the enmeshed forces of Calvinism 
and romanticism to bees versus butterflies is to evade the 
complexities of both, but the poem’s aim is sensual, not 
didactic or ideological. This sensuality is precisely why 
the butterfly’s final secret is not voiced: what matters is a 
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delightful, compact, changing body, rather than a retained 
idea or lesson.
In this poem, the speaker casts herself as a careful 
observer. Although she frames the objects of her attention 
as cute, her words do not necessarily index her, much 
less Dickinson herself, as cute. Thus, although certain 
of Dickinson’s cute nature poems are sometimes called 
childlike, the term can be misleading. The speaker in “A 
fuzzy fellow, without feet –” is not particularly fuzzy (or 
fuzzy-headed); on the contrary, she claims the authority of 
precise naming granted to botanists and other neutral adult 
observers. As robin Peel has shown, Dickinson’s approach 
to nature could be rigorously empirical.24 And yet, if the 
poet’s voice is not childlike, neither is it fully scientific in 
the modern sense, because it admits what mid-nineteenth-
century professional scientists (although not Darwin) 
were busy excluding from their field: affective experience 
in general, and cuteness in particular. By engaging with 
cuteness, and modeling this engagement for the reader, 
the poet’s speaker does not claim to master the butterfly’s 
secret, but she does embrace the opportunity to feel 
emotional affinities—fleeting but visceral moments when 
the interspecies gap narrows.
Such narrowing is sometimes figured as 
anthropomorphism, but the term anthropomorphic implies 
crystal-clear boundaries between the human and the animal. 
Haidt and Sherman point out that the cuteness response, 
by releasing sociality, encourages adults to “mentalize 
agency,” drawing babies—who are, after all, fairly alien-
looking—into the circle of moral actors.25 When the 
cuteness response is extended beyond the human, it tends 
to promote a highly affective form of anthropomorphism, 
as fuzzy-fellow-feeling overwhelms any logical sense 
of the boundaries between, say, humans and animals. 
Colleen Boggs has outlined how Dickinson participated 
in, while also revising, her culture’s use of animals as an 
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educational “supplement to liberal subjectivity.”26 
More conventional mid-nineteenth-century texts 
anthropomorphized animals to help people (children 
especially) establish their humanity through interspecies 
kindness, thereby appearing to break down, but ultimately 
reinforcing, human-animal boundaries. This impulse is 
closely related to the idea of the pathetic fallacy, first 
introduced and bemoaned by John ruskin in 1856.27 When 
Dickinson uses the cuteness response, however, she is able 
to maintain more open, less moralistic boundaries, creating 
relationships that are not necessarily anthropomorphic in 
the sense of imagining the nonhuman as human and the 
human as stable and obvious. Part of the play of affections 
involves unsettling individualistic identities.
In “Bee! I’m expecting you!” (Fr983), for example, Fly 
writes a letter without identifying himself until the end, 
so that the reader encounters the text’s familiar epistolary 
features prior to the writer’s grotesque and spindly-legged 
form. The poem opens by announcing the news of spring 
in what Helen Vendler describes as the tone of a laconic 
yankee, before signing off :
you’ll get my letter by 
The Seventeenth; reply 
or better, be with me – 
your’s, Fly. 
(lines 9-12)
Vendler calls this poem “Aesopian,” but Boggs is right 
to beware of readings that turn Dickinson’s animals into 
didactic exemplars.28 This poem’s point is not its message, 
but its affective structure: it is a poem about feeling longing.
But what is the relationship between the poem and the 
fly figure? Fly’s identity remains elusive until the last line, 
so that readers cannot focus on his body. Moreover, when 
they read Fly’s signature, questions of scale arise that block 
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any easy anthropomorphic identification: How does a Fly 
write? Is the paper so small that only a few words will fit, 
resulting in awkward enjambments? It is hard to picture a 
fly wielding a pen and it is also hard to find a fly cute. And 
yet the poem is cute, not because Fly is cute, but because he 
produces a cute (small, playful, engaging) letter. The poem 
encourages readers to be most interested, not in Fly and Bee 
as metaphors, but in the process of drafting and delivering 
and reading a text. In other words, we might understand 
“Bee! I’m expecting you!” as a poem playing at being a 
letter—with part of the game dependent on the unstable, 
nonobvious boundaries between entities: Bee, reader, Fly, 
writer. The reader’s indulgence is ultimately sparked by the 
one clear (laconic, telegraphic) available entity: the letter 
itself. Just as one might anthropomorphize a bee, one might 
also, as the Japanese practitioners of Anomalous Female 
Handwriting discovered, anthropomorphize a text and 
find it cute.29 The cuteness response thus helps the reader 
imagine, briefly, that Dickinson’s verse is alive. 
For Dickinson, then, cuteness can elicit feelings of 
affinity that in turn spark moments of play—and these, in 
turn, create further affinities. At the same time, as I noted 
from the outset, the power dynamics of cuteness can be 
vexed. Dickinson’s charming caterpillars (bats, sunbeams) 
do not function independently of the midcentury social 
world that made them imaginable. Within the limits of 
“A fuzzy fellow, without feet –,” the caterpillar’s cuteness 
makes him a protean actor in a drama that disrupts 
discourses of anthropocentric scientism. And yet, such 
hierarchical discourses pervaded Dickinson’s social world 
as they do our own, so that to find people or animals cute 
is to, at least potentially, objectify, belittle, or condescend 
to them. As the cultural critic Daniel Harris put it in an 
influential essay, “the aesthetic of cuteness creates a class 
of outcasts and mutations, a ready-made race of lovable 
inferiors whom both children and adults collect, patronize, 
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and enslave.”30 To be cute is to risk disempowerment; 
Dickinson signals her awareness of this dynamic in an early 
letter to her brother Austin, who had apparently asked her 
to write more straightforwardly:
I strove to be exalted thinking I might reach 
you and while I pant and struggle and climb 
the nearest cloud, you walk out very leisurely 
in your slippers from the Empyrean and 
without the slightest notice request me to get 
down! As simple as you please! The simplest 
of the simple—I’ll be a little ninny—a little 
pussy catty – a little red riding Hood, I’ll 
wear a Bee in my bonnet, and a rose bud in 
my hair, and what remains to do you shall be 
told hereafter.31
Margaret Homans notes that this funny passage is a serious 
reflection of, and on, the era’s skewed gender relations, in 
which men were exalted and women were infantilized. 
Perceptively, however, Homans goes on to argue that 
this passage outlines “what will become, strangely, a 
serious program of poetry-writing,” in which Dickinson 
embraces bees and bonnets, renouncing (or ironizing) lofty 
patriarchal diction while attempting to build poetic power 
and authority from a feminized subject position.32
Is this possible? Can a “little pussy catty” be taken 
seriously, or must she always be trapped in Harris’ “ready-
made race of lovable inferiors”?33 In Dickinson’s letters, 
the evidence is mixed. As T. W. Higginson’s framing of her 
letters in the Atlantic Monthly suggests, when she posed 
versions of herself as a “little shape,” “a minute host,” or an 
“obedient child,” she engaged Higginson but also risked his 
condescension.34 Higginson’s understanding of Dickinson 
became increasingly complex as their correspondence 
unfolded, but even in retrospect, when he published 
her posthumous letters, he called her “quaint” as well as 
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“cultivated,” and the label stuck, as documents from her 
reception in the 1890s reveal. 
Unpacking the extensive scholarly discussion of 
Dickinson’s textual boundaries is beyond this essay’s scope, 
as is discerning the extent to which her letters are poems 
and her poems are lyrics. For Dickinson, both poems and 
letters can be forms of play. However, Dickinson’s letter to 
Austin reflects a larger interpersonal relationship, the terms 
of which Dickinson could not control. If a poem, by contrast, 
is a letter to the world that can (perhaps fortunately) not 
write back, then its ludic capacities expand, precisely because 
the poet sets the rules of the game. Dickinson’s poems 
draw from her cultural moment while reworking or even 
ignoring existing power relations. Thus, even as cuteness 
became a public commodity aesthetic, Dickinson arranged 
her poems to generate complex, private effects that did not 
necessarily replicate the dominant culture’s terms. 
In midcentury America’s dominant culture, cuteness 
was starting to sell. one of the first Americans to monetize 
cuteness was P. T. Barnum, who, in the 1850s, understood 
that people, women especially, would pay to see cute babies 
in “baby shows.”35 By 1863, Barnum further cashed in on 
cuteness, hatching a plan to wed the 40” tall Charles “Tom 
Thumb” Stratton to another little person, lavinia Warren. 
In February of 1863, Harper’s Weekly arrived next door at 
Austin’s house, its war news displaced from the lead story 
position and its cover emblazoned with a full-page etching 
of the spectacle. Harper’s Weekly offered a blow-by-blow 
of the “pigmy” couple’s nuptials, which were witnessed 
not by guests, in the traditional sense, but by hordes of 
mostly female spectators who had purchased tickets from 
Barnum.36 The “mimic miniature Adam and Eve” then 
set off on a wedding tour of the East Coast, including six 
ticket-only “receptions” in Springfield, as the Springfield 
Republican breathlessly reported.37 
“Genl. Tom Thumb & wife, Com. nutt & Minnie Warren: four wondrously formed 
& strangely beautiful ladies & gentlemen in miniature, natures smallest editions of 
her choicest works.” c1863, hand-colored lithograph, library of Congress Prints 
and Photographs Division, accessed June 20, 2017, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/
item/2001700093/. lC-USZC2-2439.
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lori Merish sees the Tom Thumb wedding as a key 
moment in the history of nineteenth-century cuteness 
and commodity aesthetics. She argues that the “freak 
show” tradition had an uncanny, magical quality that a 
cute spectacle like Tom Thumb’s wedding tamed in favor 
of “assimilating the ‘freak’ into a familial and familiar 
structure of domination and hierarchy.”38 Mass-cultural 
cuteness, for Merish, is thus a tool of gendered and racial 
normativity; a way to discipline women into patterns of 
public consumption that felt conventionally domestic.
There is no evidence that Dickinson succumbed to Tom 
Thumb fever; even the earlier hoopla surrounding Barnum’s 
Jenny lind seems to have made the class-conscious 
Dickinsons uneasy.39 However, her poems are not immune 
to the attractive power of “mimic miniature” Adams and 
Eves. For example, “Some Keep the Sabbath Going to 
Church” (Fr236) enacts a ceremony that is scaled to fit 
bobolinks; that is, about 1:12 scale, or standard dollhouse 
size:40
Some keep the Sabbath going to Church – 
I keep it, staying at Home – 
With a Bobolink for a Chorister – 
And an orchard, for a Dome –
(lines 1-4)
An apple tree (or even several, joined at the top) is not as tall 
as a church dome, and of course, a bobolink is smaller than 
a human chorister. This scene’s slight physical awkwardness 
(how, exactly, does the speaker don wings?) is part of its 
cuteness, and its cuteness matters because the orchard 
dome has not achieved heaven’s awful perfection and fixity. 
Dickinson creates an environment that is not just small, 
but one that also calls attention to its miniaturism as a key 
feature of its power. Susan Stewart speculates that “the 
miniature represents closure, interiority, the domestic, and 
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the overly cultural,” while the gigantic represents “infinity, 
exteriority, the public, and the overly natural.”41 And yet, as 
I have argued, to play is to unsettle fixity: a small space (a 
dollhouse, an orchard) can be the site of a game that does 
not end.
This orchard is not a transcendental microcosm of 
an abstract, sublime macrocosm; it is defiantly imperfect, 
embodied, and earthbound. The poem concludes: “Instead 
of getting to Heaven at last / I’m going all along” (lines 11-
12), signaling, as Victoria Morgan argues, that “relation to 
the divine” is achieved not through telos, but through the 
present’s “chaotic multiplicity.”42 To be en route to heaven 
is not to arrive; the poem is structured not as a Christian 
eschatological narrative but as a form of ludic space. “Some 
Keep the Sabbath” depicts a world of process-oriented 
evolution and—as Asa Gray put it in his 1860 Atlantic 
review of Darwin—of “analogical inference which ‘makes 
the whole world kin.’”43 And, as Darwin himself would 
point out in his 1873 study, The Expression of the Emotions 
in Man and Animals, kin might struggle, red in tooth and 
claw, for power, but the capacity to survive, develop, and 
adapt is also contingent on our ability to compensate for 
our early—and to some degree—lifelong helplessness 
through the cultivation of emotional bonds.44 To be 
small is to depend on others, and rather than being just a 
disempowered condition, smallness here, as in the natural 
world, invites the formation of interdependent, interspecies 
bonds that comprise a contingent but emotionally vivid 
version of paradise. Power is kinship, and kinship is felt.
Gray ends his 1860 review of Darwin by admitting 
that the notion of interspecies kinship “discomposes” him 
because of its theological implications.45 What troubled 
nineteenth-century readers of Darwin also troubles this 
poem: Where does God fit in? neither distant, stately 
lover nor mechanical telescope, this God operates on a 
reduced and none-too-stately scale. The fierce God of 
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Dickinson’s Calvinist forebears could not be seen as cute, 
but a midcentury clergyman (such as the model curate in 
Dickens’s Sketches By Boz [1836]) might be.46 As a “noted 
clergyman,” God comes as close as possible to the human 
circuit of play and affection, where he is the object of the 
speaker’s gaze, and vulnerable—as preachers in Dickinson’s 
orbit so frequently were—to her wry humor (Fr236, line 
9). As a “mimic miniature” deity, he can be at least partway 
admitted into the speaker’s kinship circle, “assimilating the 
‘freak,’” as Merish puts it, into a familial structure. Instead of 
reproducing hierarchical systems, however, the poem’s little 
ceremony stages new possibilities, including the possibility 
of an earthly heaven that is not ruled by any one power, 
because it is a game—a nimble improvisation—rather than 
a system.47
Even in “Some Keep the Sabbath,” however, God is 
only potentially doted upon, not doting. He is, as Schiller 
might put it, not human because he cannot play. In all of 
Dickinson’s poems, God proves to be utterly incapable of 
the cuteness response. over and over again, adorable sayings 
and doings are offered up to a deity that cannot coo or 
dandle or tickle. Industrious angels (Fr245), a little gentian 
(Fr520), wriggling worms (Fr932), a naughty girl in a stained 
apron (Fr271): these images might captivate a reader,  but 
they cannot charm God. Emotional triangulation ensues, 
as in “of Course – I prayed” (Fr581):
of Course – I prayed –  
And did God Care? 
He cared as much as on the Air  
A Bird – had stamped her foot –  
And cried “Give Me” – 
(lines 1-5)
The cute-competent reader, confronted with the image of 
a petulant bird stamping its foot, is engaged and amused. 
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Insofar as the bird appeals, its charm is physical: It is small 
and it talks! Who could resist? But nothing moves God, 
who counts every sparrow but can’t seem to delight in them. 
By the poem’s end, the cute bird dissolves into abstract 
atoms and the speaker abandons her appeal, retreating 
into “smart Misery” (line 11). The drama of socialization 
has failed, but the principal flawed actor is not the speaker 
or the bird, but God, who is not cute-competent, although 
he is presumably smart in other (more miserable) ways. 
Including a cute bird in the first stanza does not trivialize 
the poem or the speaker; rather, to echo Gray, by an 
“analogical inference which ‘makes the whole world kin,’” 
Dickinson aligns herself emotionally with the bird and 
with the reader, positing God as an unnatural and perhaps 
even irrelevant outsider. Creatures suffer not because God’s 
Godlike omnipotence fails, but because he is not sufficiently 
human.48 If, as lorenz suggests, beauty connotes symmetry 
while cuteness connotes asymmetry,49 then God is beautiful 
and can appreciate beauty because he is perfect, but for this 
same reason, he can neither be cute nor appreciate cuteness. 
As Dickinson wrote to Higginson, commenting offhandly 
on the paradox of incarnation, “To be human is to be more 
than divine, for when Christ was divine, he was uncontented 
until he was human.”50 
Cuteness, as I have suggested, sparks moments of play—
and God consistently drops the ball, as in “I know that He 
exists” (Fr365), when the speaker attempts to posit him as a 
kindly parental figure: 
I know that He exists. 
Somewhere – in silence – 
He has hid his rare life 
From our gross eyes. 
 
’Tis an instant’s play – 
’Tis a fond Ambush – 
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Just to make Bliss 
Earn her own surprise!
(lines 1-8)
The trouble is serious: God violates the rules of hide-and-
seek by extending the game indefinitely, which makes it 
not hide-and-seek, and indeed not a game at all. rather, 
the play “prove[s] piercing earnest” (line 10) as death 
approaches and the speaker realizes that she has been 
abandoned. All of her suppositions about “a fond Ambush” 
are wrong (line 6). Thus, as Eberwein puts it, “the initial 
jollity of the celestial hide-and-seek game gives way to 
fear either of God’s indifference to the seeker … or even 
worse of the supposed hider’s nonexistence, which makes 
a mockery of the quest.”51 God isn’t playful like a father; 
indeed, throughout Dickinson’s oeuvre, he just plain can’t 
play. He is, to put it another way, joylessly fixed and literal, 
so that when humans try to capture him through metaphor 
(What if God were a cat? What if God took a nap?), He 
simply recedes from view.
If God lacks the cuteness response that would 
enable him to play appropriately, humans risk social 
inappropriateness for the opposite reason: our cuteness 
response is promiscuous. In her poems about death, 
Dickinson exploits this affective flexibility, inviting the 
reader’s cuteness response before repelling it, releasing 
urges to nurture, play, or communicate, that cannot be fully 
satisfied (although, weirdly, they can be partly satisfied) 
by corpses, graves, and postmortem images. one version 
of this dynamic emerges in “She lay as if at play” (Fr412), 
whereby a corpse takes on the look of a partly-living doll: 
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Her dancing Eyes – ajar – 
As if their owner were 
Still sparkling through 
For fun – at you –
(lines 9-12)
This poem describes how the cuteness response can 
misfire, and its effect is to underline, not the dead body’s 
grotesqueness, but the grotesqueness of the living person’s 
longing. The dead child is no longer human, but her cute 
face (corpse? photograph?) continues to invite the play-
drive. And yet, “She lay as if at play” tips its hand in the 
first line; we know this child is dead, so the poem works less 
as a visceral enticement than as a philosophical meditation 
on the fixity of death versus the mobility of cuteness. like a 
postmortem photograph (eyes closed, pupils painted on the 
lids), this image dips into the uncanny valley and ultimately 
reinforces death’s finality.
In other poems, Dickinson ambushes readers with cute 
images that partially reanimate the dead, so that the cute-
competent reader finds herself playing with graves and 
corpses. The dead are drawn halfway back into the kinship 
circle, but the play is entirely one-sided now: it cannot 
generate the kinds of affective exchanges that nourish living 
relationships. Dickinson starkly acknowledges this loss in 
“In thy long Paradise of light” (Fr1145), which reads in its 
entirety:
In thy long Paradise of light  
no moment will there be  
When I shall long for Earthly Play  
And mortal Company –
And yet, although (as she would put it elsewhere) “recess 
never comes” to paradise (Fr437, line 6), Dickinson places 
playful decoys in many of her death poems. The grave is 
figured as a cottage equipped with a tea set in “The grave 
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my little cottage is” (Fr1784, line 1); a life is extinguished 
by “a Gnat’s minutest Fan” (Fr415, line 14); the cemetery 
is a “Curious Town,” overrun with squirrels (Fr1069, line 
9); the corpse is buried “just a Daisy deep” (Fr424, line 
8); the dead even hang Christmas stockings, albeit at an 
altitude too high for “any Santa Claus to reach” (Fr344, line 
19). Such decoys, insofar as they are cute, can trigger the 
reader’s urge to touch, nurture, and play—all urges that are 
impossible to suppress and impossible to indulge, and yet 
serve as a (pretend, but felt) bridge between the living and 
the dead.
The dead speaker in “I think the longest Hour of all” 
(Fr607) ends a meditation on time with movement through 
space: 
Then I – my timid service done – 
Tho’ service ’twas, of love – 
Take up my little Violin – 
And further north – remove –
(lines 17-20)
The speaker’s “little Violin” seems curious; the poem does 
not otherwise frame the speaker as a musician, so its final 
image comes as a surprise. And yet, the violin animates the 
speaker at the moment that the speaker herself departs: 
a little violin is meant to be played. This is precisely the 
relationship that can no longer obtain, and yet the “little 
Violin” is offered up as a stand-in for a real object, a toy 
that can be taken up as if at play. The cuteness response 
animates the timid speaker and her violin without reviving 
them. Possibilities continue to be imaginable even as death 
forecloses upon them. 
Insofar as cuteness gives readers a jolt of pleasure, 
Dickinson’s death poems cater to, and manipulate, 
the cuteness response much as gothic texts exploit the 
magnetism of necrophilia. Finding death cute (like finding 
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it sexy) enables the poet to explore questions about death 
from a visceral point of view that implicates the reader in 
his or her own humanity, as in the brief poem, “A Dimple 
in the Tomb” (Fr1522), originally included in a letter to T. 
W. Higginson following the death of his infant daughter:52
A Dimple in the Tomb 
Makes that ferocious room 
A Home –
In the context of the letter, the poem was clearly meant—
and surely would have been taken—to be consoling. But a 
dimple, that quintessentially cute baby feature, depends on 
chubby limbs or a smiling face. If adults melt at the thought 
of a dimple, they cannot follow through with a pinch to 
this dead baby’s leg or cheek. “A Dimple in the Tomb” thus 
consoles, not by implying that the baby is in an abstract, 
better place, but by empathetically reproducing the grieving 
parent’s intense physical longing for the infant’s body. 
Ultimately, this unquenchable desire represents the 
double-edged sword of mediated cuteness: the poem 
generates feelings of pleasure, proximity, and kinship, but 
readers cannot take the natural next steps: vocalizing, 
feeding, cuddling, engaging in two-way play. A dimple, 
a squirrel, or a little violin cannot subdue death, but they 
can extract from the reader a nurturing impulse. This 
incapacity is frustrating, of course, but it is also a generative 
advantage: once the reader’s sensual desire is aroused, the 
poet can redirect that desire into the poem’s demands and 
complexities. once the reader’s attention has been captured, 
emotionally and physically, the cute image has done its 
work and the poem can begin to engage, on a human scale, 
with questions (what is death? why do we die?) that are 
too remote for humans to fully grasp. In this way, the dead 
work like dolls that appear, at first glance, to be capable of 
interaction. It turns out they can’t walk or talk, but it is still 
possible—and tempting—to play with them.
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FFF
Dickinson’s edgy deployments of cuteness were unusual 
in the 1860s, and cuteness would remain an underutilized 
strategy in so-called high art (although not in popular 
culture) throughout the twentieth century—with notable 
exceptions, as ngai’s work on Gertrude Stein suggests.53 
In the twentieth century, cuteness was widely deployed by 
top-down pop cultural forces such as Hallmark and Disney. 
I do not disagree that cuteness can be cynically harnessed 
to serve neoliberal economic agendas, and it is certainly 
true that the concept of cuteness coevolved with Western 
market economies—as did many other concepts, such as 
the gothic, the sublime, and the sentimental. However, to 
collapse one of the most ancient and basic human drives 
into a story about marketing Tom Thumb is to radically 
underestimate its power. Cuteness can be harnessed for 
commodification, but this need not be its sole function.
Moreover, the twentieth century is history, and as the 
media scholar Anthony McIntyre has argued, “cuteness 
is emerging as one of the dominant aesthetic categories 
of the twenty-first century.”54 our twenty-first-century 
moment manufactures and circulates endless iterations of 
cuteness, particularly via the Internet. Dickinson, too, is 
on the Internet, and her web poems, as Virginia Jackson 
puts it, “partake, by the virtue of their medium, of the new 
time frame of Web discourse: a text available at a click, 
an illusion of simultaneous production and reception, a 
public world of individual access.”55 Scholarly attention to 
Dickinson’s material production(s) has been facilitated by 
the online availability of her original texts, which are, of 
course, digital. While, in one sense, sites like the Houghton 
library’s Emily Dickinson Archive return Dickinson to her 
handmade historical context, they also place this entire 
context in the larger and more seductive framework of 
the web. That is, if Dickinson’s handwriting, marginalia, 
and jagged envelope tears put pressure on the meanings of 
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her poems, so too must the weirdly boundless text of the 
Internet itself. 
And the Internet, as D. E. Wittkower has argued, is 
ruled by cats.56 or, to elaborate more fully, the Internet has 
become dependent on capturing the attention of distracted 
viewers, and to do so, it draws most heavily on two basic 
instincts: the sexual response (porn) and the cuteness 
response (animals, babies, and baby-animal memes). 
The web environment offers anecdotal examples of what 
currently counts as cute: cross-species bonding, animals 
dressed in human clothes, novel animals, and animals 
performing humanlike activities.57 While it might seem 
like a wild historical leap to suggest that analogous scenes 
with analogous effects occur in Dickinson poems, the 
parallels are undeniable. The difference, of course, is that 
animal memes are not typically linked to complex artistic 
experiments that make demands on audiences. 
However, if in the twenty-first century cuteness is 
sometimes just clickbait, proliferating and democratizing 
forms of media have also made it available to amateurs and 
artists with more complicated agendas. Japanese artists, 
inspired by anime and manga, such as Takashi Murakami, 
are engaged with destigmatizing cuteness and exploring its 
expressive possibilities.58 Insofar as the lens through which 
we view Emily Dickinson is necessarily contemporary and 
global, it makes particular sense, in the twenty-first century, 
to accede to her cuteness as a generative aspect of her art 
and as an aspect of her implicit feminist edge. To return 
to the quotes that launched this essay: perhaps now, in the 
twenty-first century, there is nothing necessarily “smirking” 
or “weak” or “cloying” or “annoying” about the image of 
little mice tucked “Snug in Seraphic Cupboards / To nibble 
all the day” (Fr151, lines 7-8). Perhaps to find (some of ) 
Dickinson’s poetry cute is to read it competently; when 
fully engaged, the cuteness response helps readers to “dwell 
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in Possibility” (Fr466, line 1) as embodied, playful, and 
interdependent participant-observers.
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